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CASE COMMENTS
Attorney Discipline-SuSPENDED LAWYER MAY TAKE EMPLOYMENT
AS A LAW CLERK-The FloridaBar v. Thomson, 310 So. 2d 300 (Fla.
1975).
In 1972 the Florida Bar recommended that attorney Charles Thomson be disbarred.' After considering the Bar's recommendations, the
Supreme Court of Florida responded by suspending Thomson for
2 years and thereafter until he showed himself rehabilitated.2 The
charges of which Thomson was found guilty by the referee in his
disciplinary trials were numerous: (1) conviction in Palm Beach
County on two counts of issuing worthless checks; (2) conviction in
Polk County on a charge of absconding from a motel without paying
a $750.00 bill; (3) conviction in Polk County on three counts of
issuing worthless checks; (4) actively practicing law while under
suspension for failure to pay Bar dues; (5) making false affidavits
concerning his date of birth and proper name; and (6) agreeing to
perform certain services for a client, taking a fee therefor, but never
performing and never returning the fee. 4
While suspended for the preceding misconduct Thomson obtained work as a clerk with a Vero Beach law firm. 5 The Florida Bar
1.

Charles Thomson was tried by referee pursuant to

FLORIDA BAR 11.06, 32 FLA. STAT. ANN.

INTEGRATION RULE OF THE
(Supp. 1975-76). At the conclusion of the trial

the referee recommended suspension for 24 months. The Florida Bar considered the
recommended discipline too lax. The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 271 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla.
1972). The Bar thereupon petitioned the court to review the recommended discipline,
pursuant to the INTEGRATION RULF OF THE FLORIDA BAR 11 .06(9)(c)(iii) which states:
"If the Board of Governors disagrees with the discipline recommended in a referee's
report finding the respondent guilty, the Board may seek review in the Supreme Court
as provided in Rule 11.09."
2. The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 271 So. 2d 758, 762 (Fla. 1972). INTEGRATION RuLE
OF THE FLORIDA BAR 11.10(3), 32 FLA. STAT. ANN.

(Supp. 1975-76), provides that "a sus-

pension of more than three months shall require proof of rehabilitation .... " Regarding evidence for reinstatement, INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR ll.ll(l)(b), 32 FLA.
STAT. ANN.

(Supp. 1975-76), states:

The information required concerning the petitioner may include any or all
of the following matters in addition to such other matters as may be reasonably required to determine the fitness of the petitioner to resume the practice
of law: criminal and civil judgments; disciplinary judgments; copies of income
tax returns together with consents to secure original returns; occupation during
suspension and information in connection therewith; financial statement; statements of restitution of funds which were the subject matter of disciplinary
proceedings.
3. See note 1 supra.
4. The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 271 So. 2d 758, 761 (Fla. 1972).
5. Emphasizing that his work involved no client contact, Thomson described his
activities as limited to ' "work of a preparatory nature such as research, taking statements of witnesses consistent with initial investigation of a case, assembling information

1976]

CASE COMMENTS

questioned the ethical propriety of Thomson's employment and
pressured his employers to discharge him. 6 At that point Thomson
petitioned the supreme court to decide the issue of whether an attorney who is suspended from the practice of law for disciplinary
reasons may work as a clerk for a law firm during his suspension. 7 The
court decided that "under the facts and circumstances of this case"
he could.8
The majority opinion acknowledged the two principal arguments
made by the Bar. First, that allowing the employment "would be
detrimental to the integrity and reputation of the Bar
..
Second, that allowing such employment would invite violation of
the suspension order.'0 The court met the second argument squarely,
replying that though suspended, Thomson remained "subject to the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Integration Rule of the
Florida Bar,"' was directly supervised, and could be brought to
account if he overstepped his status.12 Though it noted the first argument raised by the Bar, the court declined to provide a significant
response.
Instead, the court provided a catalog of the commendable ends
to be achieved by allowing such employment: the disciplined attorney would be enabled to support his family; 3 he would be able
for review, and like work that would enable the attorney-employer to carry a given
matter to a conclusion ......
The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla.
1975).
6.
[T]he staff counsel of The Florida Bar contacted one of [Thomson's] attorneyemployers and expressed the opinion that the stated arrangement with a suspended attorney was unethical. The Bar then advised Thomson's attorney-employer that [the Bar] intended to file a grievance against him unless he ceased
Thomson's employment ....
Id. at 301.
Exactly why the Bar thought the employment unethical was not stated in the
record or in its brief. The Bar's argument on this point was phrased in general terms.
7. Id. at 300.
8. Id. The court did not mention Thomson in its formulation of the issue, choosing
instead to draw the issue in reference to "an attorney suspended from the practice of
law," 310 So. 2d at 300. The general language might be an indication that the relief
granted Thomson will be available to other attorneys, but the inclusion of the limiting
phrase "under the facts and circumstances of this case" suggests that this interpretation
would probably be too broad.
9. Id. at 301.
10. id.
11. Id. The court cited INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR 11.10(3), FLA. STAT.
ANN. (Supp. 1975-76), which states that "[d]uring such suspension the respondent shall
continue to be a member of The Florida Bar ......
12. 310 So. 2d at 302.
13. Id. The implication is that, because of Thomson's "questionable" character,
no lay employer would hire him for any type work. This leads to the apparently

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

to maintain his legal proficiency and improve his chances of passing
the reentrance examination;1 4 and finally, he would be ideally situated
to demonstrate his rehabilitation.' 5 In the opinion of the court, it

would be "unduly harsh" to the offending attorney to deny him any
opportunity of employment.'" The court reasoned that if the activities of unlicensed student law clerks are not the practice of law, then
the same activities are not the practice of law when performed by a
suspended attorney.1 7 The court drew a similar comparison to the
work of paraprofessionals and paralegals.18
Only Justice Overton dissented. He viewed the majority's decision
as "another step to effectively dilute the punishment."' 9 More important to this dissenting view was the perception that the court's
action may make professional discipline appear very lax to the public,
and may result in detriment to the integrity and reputation of the
bar.2 0 The Justice expressed doubt that any attorney in such a situa2 1
tion could successfully confine himself to preparatory functions.
anomalous result that the worse an attorney's misconduct, the more reason there
is to keep him in the profession since no reputable lay employer would consider hiring
him. The ultimate end would seem to be that the most debased lawyers of all must
at last go to work for the court itself, since not even law firms would have them.
14. 310 So. 2d at 302. The court pointed out that attorneys who, for disciplinary
reasons, have not been practicing law may be required to retake and pass the bar
examination, at the court's discretion. See INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR
11.10(3), 32 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1975-76).
15. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
16. 310 So. 2d at 302.
17. There is no question that, had Thomson been a student law clerk, his activities
would not have raised the issue of unauthorized practice of law. Payton, Law Office
Personnel and Legal Ethics, 48 FLA. B.J. 747 (1974). The question is whether Thomson's
activities, in light of his status, sufficiently resemble the practice of law to violate his
disciplinary sentence.
18. The paralegal comparison, as the law clerk comparison, (note 17 and accompanying text supra) is rebuttable. The comparison is based on seeming similarity of status;
both suspended attorneys and paralegals are forbidden to practice law. The court
reasoned that holding persons of similar status to different standards would be unjust,
if it is assumed that what is not the practice of law for one is likewise not for the
other. The significant difference is that suspended attorneys are members of the Bar, 310
So. 2d at 301, while paralegals and law clerks are not. The Bar professes to hold itself
to higher standards of ethical conduct than the general population. State ex rel.
Florida Bar v. Fishkind, 107 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1958). It follows that there is no inequity
in holding suspended attorneys to higher standards than those applied to nonlawyers.
Even if the validity of the comparison were accepted, there is still significant
controversy whether paralegals engage in the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g.,
Rivkind, Paralegal-A Stormy Petrel, 48 FLA. B.J. 745 (1974).
19. 310 So. 2d at 303.
20. Id.
21. The dissenting opinion notes that the Bar's disciplinary rules presently have
no provision for actively monitoring such employment to assure compliance with the
suspension order. Id.
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The dissent found the analogy between law clerks and suspended attorneys performing the same work flawed by its failure to consider
the difference between the underlying reasons for the attorney's suspension and the student's inability to practice law.2 2 The dissent
therefore concluded that, given present disciplinary rules, 23 a suspended attorney "should not be employed as a clerk for an attorney
or law firm . . . during the ... suspension .... "24
The question raised in Thomson is one of first impression in
Florida, and it appears that the issue has been dealt with directly in
only one other jurisdiction.25 The general question of disciplined
lawyers working in a law office has, however, been dealt with in
several cases though none were cited by the court.2 6 Although in the
reported cases the clerking activities were more extensive than those
involved in Thomson, the courts evinced an adverse, if not positively
hostile, reaction to the concept of a suspended attorney working in
a law office. In deciding this case as it did, the supreme court differed
with the philosophy and results of all but two 2 7 of the reported cases
on the subject.
Since the disciplined attorney in this case interviewed and took
statements from witnesses, the question of appearances to the general
22.

Id.

1967-1968, SELECTED
No. 65-69, at 333 (1969), recognizes the same flaw in Thomson's
analogy. The opinion states, "A lawyer should not employ a disbarred lawyer for
legal research." The comment continues:
Some may see the situation as similar to tile employment of a law student
or law clerk who is studying for the bar examination. The Committee sees a
difference between a law student or neophyte law graduate, who has not yet
completed his training and examinations, and the employment of a person who
has practiced law and whose right to do so has been revoked by proper authority
because of demonstrated unworthiness. Id. at 333-34.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. 310 So. 2d at 303.
25. In re Lizotte, 79 A. 960 (R.I. 1911).
26. See, e.g., Crawford v. State Bar, 355 P.2d 490 (Cal. 1960) (although services
performed by disbarred attorney might have been performed by laymen, it does not
follow that when they are performed by an attorney, they do not involve the practice
of law); In re McKelvey, 255 P. 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (the giving of advice to
employer's clients on small matters by disbarred attorney employed as law office
assistant was not unauthorized practice of law); Application of Christianson, 215 N.W.2d
920 (N.D. 1974) (suspended attorney may work as a law clerk); Houts v. State ex rel.
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 486 P.2d 722 (Okla. 1971) (a disbarred attorney who contracted to recode a city's ordinances, who prepared and filed annual reports in guardianship cases, and who selected appropriate deeds and contracts for transferring property,
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law).
27. In Application of Christianson, 215 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1974), Christianson petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for reinstatement as an attorney. The court
denied his petition because Christianson had been guilty of the unauthorized practice
of law during his suspension. The court said: "On the one hand, it seems extremely
OPINIONS,
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public is relevant. In re Lizotte 28 involved an attorney under disciplinary suspension who was brought before the court for performing
law office tasks that the court recognized laymen could legitimately
perform. Lizotte argued that he was performing the activities of a
clerk. The opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court left no
doubt as to its position:
It has been urged as an excuse for this conduct of the respondent
that the things which he is charged with doing in violation of said
decree he might well do if he was not a member of the bar ....
The purpose of this court is not to be nullified by an approval
of such reasoning. [This court] will not permit its disciplinary
orders to be evaded, nor will it allow its officer to publicly disregard its decree by such a subterfuge. .

.

. While it is true that

persons who are not of the legal profession at times assume to do
the things which this respondent has done since his suspension,
they do not, and they would not be permitted to, so act in the
guise of attorneys at law. Members of the bar who are under suspension will be required to comply with the terms of the decree
suspending them in such a manner that there may be no ground
for suspicion on the part of other members of the bar or of the
public that the decrees of this court are not being exactly observed
in their letter and their spirit.29

Similarly, in State ex rel. Patton v. Marron,"° the New Mexico Supreme Court said of a suspension order it had rendered: "[O]nce an
order is made, [the court] owes it to itself, the members of the bar,
and the public, to see that the order is fully and fairly obeyed and
to punish for its violation." 31
harsh to rule that a suspended lawyer . .. should further be deprived of opportunities
to earn a living by . . . doing legal research as a law clerk to a licensed attorney."
Id. at 924. Christianson is weak authority on this point because: (1) the parts of the
opinion dealing with suspended lawyers as law clerks are dicta; (2) the court did not
say it would allow such activity on the part of suspended lawyers, but only that it
seemed harsh not to allow it; and (3) the opinion contains a serious internal inconsistency. The court cites as authority for its position on the clerking issue In re McKelvey, 255 P. 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927). McKelvey stated that sympathy must not be
the deciding factor in disciplinary matters; the Christianson court, however, clearly
based its decision on sympathy for Christianson.
McKelvey is itself a victim of the same contradiction. On being petitioned by
McKelvey for reinstatement, the court stated that employment as a law clerk of an attorney who is under discipline is not objectionable. The McKelvey court disavowed
sympathy as a legitimate consideration, yet based its decision on sympathy. The court
pointed out that the attorney seeking reinstatement was 67 years old and had been
disbarred for 10 years. 255 P. at 836.
28. 79 A. 960 (R.I. 1911).
29. Id. at 961.
30. 167 P. 9 (N.M. 1917).
31. Id. at 11.
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The Supreme Court of Florida has on numerous occasions stated
that the public interest should be the primary consideration in any
disciplinary proceeding.3 2 Yet the principal focus of the Thomson
opinion was upon the disciplined attorney's personal plight. The
court noted that there was a "public appearance" argument; however,
it not only failed to balance the conflicting demands involved, but
declined to provide any response to the argument. The opinion mentioned the public only once, sandwiching it in a single sentence
reference between the interests of the disciplined attorney, his family,
and his law firm-employer on one side, and the interests of the "Bar
as a whole" on the other.3 3 (The court offered several affirmative
justifications for allowing the employment 3 4 but all were predicated
upon concern for the disciplined attorney.) The dissent clearly felt
the public's interest had not been given sufficient consideration.3 5
32. See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 271 So. 2d 758, 761 (Fla. 1972) ("The
purpose of assessing penalties is to protect the public interest .... ."); The Florida
Bar v. Beaver, 259 So. 2d 143, 144 (Fla. 1972) ("In determining the discipline to
which respondent should be subjected, we must be primarily guided by the welfare of
the public and the legal profession."); The Florida Bar v. Loveland, 249 So. 2d 19 (Fla.
1971); The Florida Bar v. Winn, 208 So. 2d 809 (Fla.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968)
("Disciplinary proceedings are essentially a function of the Court instituted in the
public interest .... ." 208 So. 2d at 810. A disciplinary proceeding "does not afford
redress for a private grievance. It is an act undertaken and carried forward solely for
the public welfare." Id. at 811, citing In re Keenan, 192 N.E. 65, 68 (Mass. 1934)); State
ex rel. Florida Bar v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. 1961) ("In prescribing the
judgment hereafter announced we take into consideration that our order should give
"); Petition of
due regard to the public interest [in disciplinary proceedings] ......
Florida State Bar Ass'n, 186 So. 280, 289 (Fla. 1938) ("[P]ractice of the law is not an
inherent right. It is a privilege or franchise granted by the state, and, being so, its
exercise may be regulated in the interest of the public."). See also 4 MIAMI L.Q. 111, 113
(1950): "The discipline of unethical practitioners is only an incidental objective of the
integrated bar. Rather, integration is designed . . . to give the bar a true concept of
its relation to the public and to the profession."
The integration of the Florida Bar into a cohesive whole was accomplished via the
Integration Rule of The Florida Bar. The rule was formulated at the direction of the
supreme court, and defines the functions and organization of The Florida Bar. The
rule states that "[t]he primary purpose of discipline of attorneys is the protection of the
public ....
" INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR 11.02, 32 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
1975-76). The majority of jurisdictions are likewise guided primarily by the public's
interest in dealing in disciplinary matters. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Burris, 500 S.W.2d
357 (Ark. 1973); Fords Case, 149 A.2d 863 (N.H. 1959). See also Manning, A Socio-Ethical
Foundation for Meeting the Obligations of the Legal Profession, 5 CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD
L. REv. 237 (1974).
33. 310 So. 2d at 302: "Thus, we think Thomson should not be prohibited from
employment . . . inasmuch as such employment is clearly beneficial to him, his family,
Id.
his attorney-employers, the public and the Bar .....
34. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
35. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra. The dissent's arguments revolve
around the public interest: (1) the public would be confused; (2) the suspended attorney at bar had cheated a member of the public; and (3) the public has no protection
against the further derelictions of the suspended attorney.
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On prior occasions the court has acknowledged that the legal profession must have the public's confidence in order to properly perform its duties.36 If this is to be more than a platitude, maintaining
the public's confidence in the bar necessitates discipline of members
who bring discredit upon the profession.3 7 In State ex rel. Florida Bar
v. Murrell, the court succinctly stated that while the decision to
discipline "must be fair to respondent at the same time the duty of
the court to society is paramount. ' '8 In In re Gaines3 9 the Alabama
Supreme Court, on petition of a disciplined attorney for reinstatement, said: "We confess we have been somewhat moved to sympathy
[for the petitioner] . . . .Sympathy, however, is not the pole star to
guide judicial decision and such recommendations, where apparently
motivated principally by sympathy and the belief that the petitioner
has been sufficiently punished, do not constitute sufficient basis for
reinstatement." The United States Supreme Court enunciated the
40
same principle in Ex parte Wall:
But when such a case [of obvious misconduct] is shown to exist,
the courts ought not to hesitate, from sympathy for the individual,
to protect themselves from scandal and contempt, and the public
persons from parfrom prejudice, by removing grossly improper
41
ticipation in the administration of the laws.
Henry Drinker, recognized as the eminent authority in the area
of professional ethics and attorney discipline, has also indicated strong
disapproval of sympathy as a deciding factor. Mr. Drinker has noted
that the profession often feels sorry for the backsliding lawyer and
his family. Out of sympathy, the profession will recommend leniency
36. E.g., The Florida Bar v. Wagner, 212 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1968), where the court
the respect
approvingly quotes the referee in the disciplinary trial below: "A'Without
and confidence of the public, it is impossible for the profession to discharge its
duties effectively and efficiently, which duties are graver now than ever before in history.' "
Id. at 773. In In re Florida Bar, 301 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 1974), the court said: "It is
[the court's] responsibility to . . . maintain the image and integrity of the Florida Bar
as a whole."
THE FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RFSPONSIBILITY Canon 9: "A Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety." If this be true of an individual
lawyer, it must also be true for the profession as a whole. See also Sheppard, The
Lawyer's Ethical Response, 49 FLA. B.J. 184, 186 (1975).
37. See State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Fishkind, 107 So. 2d 131, 133 (Fla. 1958) (the
profession is often measured in the layman's mind by the manner in which it disciplines
attorneys who violate professional rules of conduct).
38. 74 So. 2d 221, 227 (Fla. 1954).
39. 37 So. 2d 273, 274 (Ala. 1948). See In re McKelvey, 255 P. 834 (Cal. Ct. App.
1927).
40. 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
41. Id. at 288.
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and this leniency, Drinker observed, will not be tolerated by the
public.42 It has been said that the highest degree of development of
a profession is "[t]he stage where public needs are placed paramount
to professional rights and even desires. ' ' 43 As recently as 1970, the
Clark Committee, commissioned by the American Bar Association to
study disciplinary enforcement, observed that "a policy that benefits
the individual complainant while exposing the public at large to
substantial risks is inconsistent with the primary purpose of disciplinary
enforcement-the . . . protection of the public."" There are probably
mitigating circumstances in every instance of public attorney discipline.451 The public, however, is only aware of the fact that an
attorney, who has been found guilty of misconduct, is nevertheless
continuing to work within the profession. There is clearly a substantial
risk that the public will conclude that the legal profession winks at the
derelictions of its members. Such a conclusion can only erode confidence in the integrity of the profession as a whole. The public interest cannot be served by a bar in which the public lacks confidence.
At a time when public opinion of the profession is already low, 4' the
public interest argument is entitled to a more meaningful response
than that announced in Thomson.
DOUGLAS
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42. The Public's Impression of Lawyers' Ethics-A Panel Discussion, 7 U. FLA. L.
REV. 439, 448 (1954).
43. Kohne, The Significance of the Professional Ideal, 101 ANNALS 1, 4 (1922).
44. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 99 (Final
Draft 1970).
45. Thomson testified that he was undergoing serious personal problems at the
time of his misconduct. 271 So. 2d at 762.
46. See generally Carrington, The Ethical Crises of American Lawyers, 36 U. Pirr.
L. REV. 35, 49 (1974); Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60
A.B.A.J. 821 (1974); Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of
Boston Lawyers, 9 SUFF. U.L. REV. 66 (1974); ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY
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public dissatisfaction

with

2 (Final Draft 1970): "The Committee emphasizes that the
the

bar and

the

courts is

much

more

intense

than

is

generally believed within the profession." The above committee report was written
before the Watergate affair.

